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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas Fernandez appeals from the district court’s order denying his request for courtappointed post-conviction counsel and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the factual background of Fernandez’s underlying criminal
case as follows:
On June 2, 2014, the Petitioner entered an [sic] Conditional Alford plea of
guilty to Count 1: Driving Under the Influence, a felony, violation of Idaho Code
Sections 18-8004 and 18-8005(9). The Petitioner also entered a Conditional plea
of guilty to the persistent violator enhancement under Idaho Code Section 192514. The Court entered a Judgment of Conviction on July 21, 2014. The Court
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, consisting of [a] minimum period of
confinement of 2.5 years and an indeterminate period of confinement of 12.5
years.
Prior to entry of the condition[al] guilty pleas, defense counsel hired
experts to challenge the accuracy of the breath test. Defense counsel reported that
the experts would testify as to the accuracy of the breath test and how diabetes
and gastro-esophageal reflux disease (GERD) may affect breath test results. The
State filed a motion in limine to prevent the expert from testifying on the subjects.
This Court granted the motion due to lack of evidence of Petitioner's elevated
blood sugar levels, ketoacidosis, GERD, acid reflux, or unabsorbed alcohol in his
stomach at the time of the traffic stop.
(R., pp.27-28.)
Fernandez appealed, challenging both his conviction and the district court’s order
granting the state’s motion in limine. (R., p.28.) In an unpublished opinion, the Court of
Appeals affirmed both. State v. Fernandez, Docket No. 42370, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 724
(Idaho App., November 19, 2015).

1

On December 27, 2016, Fernandez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to adduce additional expert witnesses
for trial and present evidence that he was in a state of ketoacidosis when officers administered
his breath test. (R., pp.3-22.) Fernandez also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (R.,
p.25.)

The district court denied the request for court-appointed counsel on the basis that

Fernandez’s petition for post-conviction relief failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim, and
gave notice of its intent to dismiss the frivolous petition. (R., pp.27-35.) After Fernandez
responded to the notice (R., pp.56-64), the district court dismissed his petition (R., pp.66-73).
Fernandez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.75-78.)
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ISSUE
Fernandez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Fernandez’s
Motion for the Appointment of Counsel because it applied the incorrect legal
standard?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Fernandez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for appointed counsel to pursue his patently frivolous petition for post-conviction
relief?
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ARGUMENT
Fernandez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
His Motion For Appointed Counsel To Pursue His Patently Frivolous Petition For PostConviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Fernandez’s motion for court-appointed counsel and summarily

dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because he failed to allege facts showing the
possibility of a valid post-conviction claim and his petition was subject to summary dismissal.
(R., pp.28-30, 66-71.) On appeal, Fernandez contends that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his request for court-appointed counsel. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) Application
of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, demonstrates that Fernandez
failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim. The district court, therefore, properly denied his
motion for appointed counsel and dismissed his frivolous post-conviction petition. The district
court should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed by

Idaho Code § 19-4904. “The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies
within the discretion of the district court.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d
1108, 1111 (2004); see also Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App.
2009). In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, “[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review.” Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140
(2001)).
4

C.

The District Court Properly Denied Fernandez’s Request For Counsel And Dismissed His
Petition Because He Failed To Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania

v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). While a district court may, pursuant to Idaho Code § 194904, appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner in certain circumstances, the
court is only required to appoint counsel when a petitioner “alleges facts showing the possibility
of a valid claim that would require further investigation on the defendant’s behalf.” Swader v.
State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at
1112. In determining whether the alleged facts justify the appointment of counsel, “every
inference must run in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and
cannot be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.” Charboneau, 140 Idaho
at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. However, where the claims in the petition are so patently
frivolous that there is no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim, with or
without counsel’s assistance, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the
usual procedure for dismissing the meritless post-conviction petition. Workman v. State, 144
Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670.
The claims in Fernandez’s petition are patently frivolous, and there is no possibility that
they could be developed into a viable claim, because they fail as a matter of law. Fernandez
claimed that, were counsel appointed, he could do research that might find sufficient factual
support to provide the necessary foundation to allow expert testimony regarding adverse health
consequences (such as ketoacidosis) caused by his diabetes. (R., pp.44, 62-64.) His contention,
apparently, was that such conditions could cause his breath test readings to be an inaccurate
measure of his true blood alcohol content. (See R., pp.9-10, 13, 16-17, 28.) Even assuming that
Fernandez was correct, this evidence would be entirely irrelevant.
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Fernandez was convicted of driving under the influence based on measurements of the
elevated blood alcohol concentration in samples of his breath. (See R., p.8; see also State v.
Fernandez, Docket No. 42370, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 724, pp.1-2 (Idaho App., November
19, 2015.) Idaho Code § 18-8004 makes operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.08,
as measured by a test of the blood, breath, or urine, a per se criminal offense. Idaho appellate
courts have repeatedly explained that the actual level of alcohol concentration in a subject’s
blood is irrelevant under this per se theory. State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 451, 375 P.3d 279,
282 (2016) (citing Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200, 204-05, 280 P.3d
703, 707-08 (2012)); -see --also -----------State v. Hardesty, 136 Idaho 707, 709, 39 P.3d 647, 649 (Ct. App.
2002). Under Idaho Code § 18-8004(4), “the standard is no longer the concentration of alcohol
in the driver’s blood.” Jones, 160 Idaho at 451, 375 P.3d at 282 (quoting Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho
at 205, 280 P.3d at 708). Rather, “a violation can be shown simply by the results of a test for
alcohol concentration that complies with the statutory requirements.” Id. (quoting Elias-Cruz,
153 Idaho at 204, 280 P.3d at 707).
Because there is no legal basis for pursuing expert witness testimony regarding what is,
by definition, legally irrelevant evidence, Fernandez’s petition for post-conviction relief fails to
raise even the possibility of a valid claim. The district court correctly denied his request for
court-appointed counsel.
Moreover, as the district court found, Fernandez’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was frivolous, not only because he had failed to present sufficient facts to support his
claims at the post-conviction stage, but because no factual basis existed to provide foundation for
additional expert testimony. (R., pp.33-35; 69-70.) There was no evidence that Fernandez was
experiencing ketoacidosis or even that his blood sugar was elevated at the time the breath test
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was administered; in fact, the evidence presented below showed that his blood sugar level was
normal. (R., p.34.) Fernandez failed to produce evidence, either below or on post-conviction,
that he had previously been diagnosed with GERD. (Id.) He failed to produce evidence, either
below or on post-conviction, that he had unabsorbed alcohol in his stomach or that he belched
during (both of) the breath test administrations. (Id.) In fact, Fernandez asserted that “evidence
of the medical condition in which the Petitioner was in at the time” did not exist, because it was
neither “preserve[d] or collect[ed].” (R., p.64.) Because there was no factual basis to allow
expert witness testimony in support of Fernandez’s allegations, his claim that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to call additional expert witnesses was patently frivolous, and the district
court correctly determined that it could detect no possibility of a valid claim. (R., p.32.)
On appeal, Fernandez argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying an
outdated legal standard.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)

He contends that the district court

determined that his petition was frivolous based on analysis under Idaho Code § 19-852, that a
reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring the action at his own
expense, and that this statute no longer controls. (Id.) Review of the district court’s decision,
however, shows no abuse of discretion.
First, the state agrees that subsequent case law has determined that Idaho Code § 19-852
no longer directly controls the decision to appoint counsel. See Swader, 143 Idaho at 653, 152
P.3d at 14. But it does not appear that the district court specifically relied on that statute when it
reached its decision. Rather, its only citation to the statute is incidental, as part of a block quote
of Charboneau. (See R., pp.29-30). Moreover, the legal standard of the reasonable person with
adequate means still survives: In Swader, this Court held that “the trial court should appoint
counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
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reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further
investigation into the claim.” Swader, 143 Idaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added). If the
reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to retain counsel, the petition is
patently frivolous—in that it fails to show even the possibility of a valid claim—and the district
court may properly deny counsel.
Second, even had the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it denied
Fernandez’s motion for court-appointed counsel, such error would still not require reversal in
this case. Where the district court applies an incorrect legal standard when denying a motion for
court-appointed counsel, this Court will simply review the petition and determine, under the
correct legal standard, whether or not the appointment of counsel is appropriate. See Swader,
143 Idaho at 653, 152 P.3d at 14 (the question when a district court fails to apply the correct
legal standard governing requests for appointment of counsel is whether, applying the correct
legal standard, the motion for appointment of counsel would have been granted); accord Melton
v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 343, 223 P.3d 281, 285 (2009); Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d
1, 4 (Ct. App. 2009). Applying the correct legal standards, as demonstrated above, Fernandez’s
petition was patently frivolous because it failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Therefore, even had the district court applied an erroneous legal standard, Fernandez has still
failed to show that it was ultimately error for the district court to deny his motion for appointed
counsel, and the district court’s order should still be affirmed.
Because Fernandez failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a valid postconviction claim, the district court correctly exercised its discretion by denying Fernandez’s
motion for court-appointed counsel. The district court’s order denying counsel should therefore
be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Fernandez’s motion for court-appointed counsel and summarily dismissing his patently frivolous
petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer______________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer______________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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